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Abstract
This paper studies the behavior of several macroeconomic variables
during disinﬂationary episodes in Latin-America and the Caribbean
(LAC). In particular, it focuses on disinﬂations from low and moderate
peaks for the period 1973-2001. The methodology used for studying
the average behavior of macroeconomic variables across disinﬂations
overcomes the traditional problem of scarce long time series (of high
frequency data) that has hindered the empirical research of monetary
shocks in many LAC countries. Some of the important ﬁndings are as
follows: (i) while GDP growth slowed down during the disinﬂations
of the 70s and 80s, there is no evidence of this for the 90s; (ii) the
trade balance signiﬁcantly deteriorated during the disinﬂations; (iii)
the nominal devaluation rate slowed down during the episodes; and
(iv) the real exchange rate appreciated during the episodes.
Keywords: Inﬂation, Growth, Disinﬂation, Trade Balance, Exchange Rate.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, E32, E52, F43.
∗I am especially grateful to Laurence Ball for many valuable discussions on earlier drafts
of the paper. Comments by Andre Lunardelli, Christopher Carroll, Thomas Lubik, Louis
Maccini and participants at the Johns Hopkins University Macro Seminar and Lacea 2003
Annual Meeting also helped improve the paper. All remaining errors are mine. An earlier
version of the paper circulated under the title “The Economy During Disinﬂations”.
†Email: mahofste@uniandes.edu.co. Address: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de
Econom´ ıa; Cra 1 No. 18A-10; Bogot´ a, Colombia. Tel: 57-1-3394949, ext 3633. Fax: 57-1-
3324021.BAJAR LA INFLACI´ ON EN AM´ ERICA LATINA Y
EL CARIBE: EL CASO DE INFLACIONES BAJAS
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Resumen
Este art´ ıculo estudia el comportamiento de algunas variables macro-
econ´ omicas durante procesos desinﬂacionarios en Am´ erica Latina y
el Caribe. En particular, el art´ ıculo en enfoca en las desinﬂaciones
desde picos inﬂacionarios bajos y moderados para el per´ ıodo 1973-
2001. Al estudiar el comportamiento de las variables a trav´ es de las
desinﬂaciones, se supera la necesidad de largas series de tiempo de
variables macro de alta frecuencia, que ha obstaculizado el an´ alisis
emp´ ırico de choques monetarios en la regi´ on. El art´ ıculo encuentra que:
(i) el crecimiento econ´ omico se desaceler´ o durante las desinﬂaciones
de los 70s y 80s, pero no durante las ca´ ıdas de la inﬂaci´ on de los 90s;
(ii) la balanza comercial se deterior´ o durante las desinﬂaciones; (iii)
la depreciaci´ on nominal se redujo durante los episodios estudiados y
(iv) la tasa de cambio real se apreci´ o durante las desinﬂaciones.
Palabras clave: inﬂaci´ on, crecimiento, desinﬂaci´ on, balanza comercial, tasa
de cambio.
Clasiﬁcaci´ on JEL: E31, E32, E52, F43.1 Introduction
In response to the infamous inﬂa t i o ni nL a t i n - A m e r i c aa n dt h eC a r i b b e a n
(LAC) during the 70s, 80s and early 90s , economists studied exhaustively the
region’s attempts at stabilization from high inﬂation rates (e.g., Calvo and
Végh, 1999; Hamann, 2001). During the 1990s, LAC countries undertook
what would turn out to be a very successful disinﬂationary process. Indeed,
since 1997, more than half of the LAC countries have had annual inﬂation
rates below 10% with the average being below 15%, —a scenario that had
not occurred since 1971. Given this new inﬂation scenario, it has become
apparent that policymakers will face, in the present and in the near future,
questions related to disinﬂations from moderate or low inﬂation rates and the
sustainability of reasonable price stability. Given this fact, it is striking to
observe how little attention has been devoted in the literature to the behavior
of LAC economies during such disinﬂations.
The relevance of disinﬂations can hardly be overstated, as they signif-
icantly aﬀect many aspects of the macroeconomic environment. Mankiw
(2004, p. 523), for instance, argues that when "economies reduce their rate
of inﬂation, they almost always experience a period of high unemployment
and low output." Eichenbaum and Evans (1995, p. 1006) ﬁnd that dur-
ing disinﬂations, there are "signiﬁcant, persistent appreciations in exchanges
rates, both nominal and real." Finally, Lane (2000) shows that disinﬂations
are associated with signiﬁcant deteriorations in current accounts.
Unfortunately, those conclusions are mainly based on empirical results
obtained using data from developed countries, and very little is known as
to whether they hold for developing economies. This aspect is particularly
important as, from a theoretical point-of-view, developing economies have
characteristics that could alter the conclusions cited above. For instance,
many developing countries have been plagued by repeated inﬂationary crises
that might erode nominal rigidities, alter the expectations formation mech-
anisms and deteriorate the credibility of policymakers. Furthermore, many
developing nations have generated indexation mechanisms that might also
inﬂuence macroeconomic variables during disinﬂations (Fischer, 1988). Fi-
nally, it is also important to note that, generally speaking, these countries
do not have unemployment insurance. The latter has been shown to be an
important determinant of the long-run implications of monetary policy (Ball
1997, 1999). Given the relevance of these elements in models dealing with
disinﬂation, many of the stylized facts supported by OECD data, do not nec-
2essarily extend to the case of developing countries. Obtaining a set of stylized
facts related to what happens to several macroeconomic variables during dis-
inﬂations in developing economies is important both for policy-makers and
academic researchers. The aim of this paper is precisely to provide such
evidence.
There are several reasons explaining why the literature has not focused
on this important topic for developing nations. The ﬁrst obvious reason
is that low inﬂation is a new phenomena in the region. Indeed, the LAC
countries had a terrible inﬂation history during the 70s, 80s and early 90s.
That dark inﬂation period peaked in 1990 when LAC’s median inﬂation rate
reached a staggering 39.4%, corresponding to an average annual rate across
countries of 1152% (see Figure 1). With those statistics, it is not surprising
that research in LAC —both theoretical and empirical— has focused on stabi-
lization attempts from high inﬂation, neglecting the analysis of disinﬂations
from moderate and low peaks. Additionally, the lack of proper data has also
impeded systematic research in this area. Indeed, the use of VAR (and simi-
lar) estimation methods and the consequent examination of impulse response
functions —common tools in the analysis of monetary shocks— has been very
scarce in LAC samples. This is mainly because these techniques require long
high-frequency time series of several macro variables, ideally over time spans
during which the economy has been stable (in the sense of not experienc-
ing, for instance, hyperinﬂation). The lack of such data has also hindered
research on disinﬂations in many LAC countries.
The goal of this paper is to study the behavior of LAC economies during
disinﬂations from low and moderate inﬂation peaks. It focusses on a set
of four important macroeconomic variables: inﬂation, output growth, trade
balance and exchange rates. The main objective is to set the stylized facts
straight and point out cases where we might need new theories or further
empirical work to explain particular outcomes. In this paper we do not
attempt to go beyond this description of the main macroeconomic stylized
facts and some preliminary speculations explaining some outcomes we ﬁnd.
A few of the interesting questions that arise from the stylized facts identiﬁed
along the paper, are more deeply explored in a couple of companion papers
(Hofstetter, 2007a and 2007b). Other relevant questions are left for future
research.
To overcome the lack of long time series of high frequency data, this paper
emphasizes the cross-section evidence on disinﬂations, taking advantage of
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Figure 1: The median inﬂation rate for the LAC countries, 1970-2002. Source:
Author’s calculations based on International Monetary Fund, International Finan-
cial Statistics, various issues.
the data availability hurdle is avoided. At the same time, predictions on the
paths followed by the variables after disinﬂationary shocks are obtained and
their statistical signiﬁcance made assessable.
Some of our most important ﬁndings are the following: (i) there is a sig-
niﬁcant GDP growth slowdown during the disinﬂations of the 70s and 80s
but no evidence of such a slowdown during the 90s; (ii) there is a signiﬁ-
cant deterioration of the trade balance during disinﬂations; (iii) the nominal
devaluation rate slows down during the disinﬂations, mimicking the path fol-
lowed by the inﬂa t i o nr a t ea n d( i v )t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea p p r e c i a t e sd u r i n g
the episodes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 begins
by describing the sample of disinﬂations in the LAC countries (for low and
moderate peaks) for the period 1973-2001 and highlighting some relevant
summary statistics. The average behavior across episodes of several macro-
economic variables is then analyzed. This strategy is applied to the current
account in section 3, the GDP growth in section 4, and the exchange rate
in section 5. In all cases the analysis is framed within a discussion of the
possible hypotheses that might explain the results. Section 6 concludes, dis-
cusses policy-implications and considers possible avenues for future research
and limitations.
42 Disinﬂations in LAC
The set of disinﬂations from low and moderate peaks in the LAC countries
used here is borrowed from Hofstetter (2007a). Before proceeding any fur-
ther, we highlight the main characteristics of his methodology to identify
disinﬂations from low and moderate trend inﬂation rates and describe a few
summary statistics from the sample.1 Readers interested in a more detailed
discussion of the method and the related literature should refer to Hofstetter
(2007a).
Disinﬂation: A disinﬂation starts at the inﬂation peak (labeled period
0), ends at the trough (period T), and requires that: (i) the peak is 30%
or less; (ii) the inﬂation rate drop by at least 1.5% points between peak
and trough; (iii) inﬂation should fall 1/4 or more from its initial level (for
e x a m p l e ,i ft h ep e a ki s1 6 % ,w er e q u i r ei n ﬂa t i o nt od r o pt oa tl e a s t1 2 % ) ;
(iv) a revision of the historical records corroborate that economic policy
was indeed disinﬂationary. Hofstetter (2007a) applied this rule to the LAC
countries for the period 1973-2000, and identiﬁed 34 episodes. This is the
sample of disinﬂations used throughout this paper. Table A in the appendix
reproduces the list of episodes included and their main characteristics.
Stylized facts: Table 1 presents summary statistics condensing rele-
vant aspects of average disinﬂations. It presents separate statistics for the
episodes from the 90s. The reason for this is that during that decade, most
LAC countries pursued structural reforms, inclusive of a sharp move towards
independent Central Banks (e.g., Lora, 2001). By looking at the 90s sepa-
r a t e l y ,w et a k eaﬁrst look at the potential impact these reforms had on our
variables of interest during disinﬂations.
T a b l e1s h o w st h a tL A Cd i s i n ﬂations last roughly three years and usually
cut the inﬂation rate by half. Moreover, disinﬂations during the 90s were
longer and stronger. Indeed, episodes during the earlier decades lasted 10
quarters, whereas during the 90s, the average jumped to 13. During the
90s, disinﬂations were also more pronounced. This manifested itself both in
points dropped during average episodes and in relative terms with respect to
the initial peak.
1Trend inﬂation corresponds to an eight-quarter moving average of the quarterly CPI
inﬂation rate, as in Ball (1994).
5Inflation Peaks Inflation Peaks
Below 20%  20%-30%
Number of episodes 18 16
        In the 70's and 80's 11 11
        In the 90's 7 5
Average Length of Episodes (in years) 2.9 2.8
        In the 70's and 80's 2.7 2.5
        In the 90's 3.3 3.4
Maximum Peak 19.6 29.6
Average Peak 16.1 25.4
        In the 70's and 80's 16.0 25.4
        In the 90's 16.3 25.5
Average drop in inflation 8.8 13.8
        In the 70's and 80's 8.3 13.1
        In the 90's 9.8 15.1
 Percentage Average drop in inflation 55.2 53.8
        In the 70's and 80's 51.7 51.1
        In the 90's 60.6 59.6
Average Speed 3.4 5.6
        In the 70's and 80's 3.6 5.6
        In the 90's 3.1 5.5
LAC 1973:2000
Summary Statistics
Table 1. Summary statistics of disinﬂations. Source: Hofstetter, 2007a.
Complementing the results in Table 1, Figure 2 takes an alternative look
at the data by plotting the average inﬂa t i o na c r o s se p i s o d e sf o rt h ep e r i o d s
(-2,4), where again period 0 corresponds to the inﬂation peak. Thus, for
instance, the inﬂation rate for period 1 of the Figure is obtained by averaging
the inﬂation rates for that period across episodes. Furthermore, the graph is
built using only episodes lasting two to three years. This allows to focus on
the ‘representative disinﬂation’ —almost 3/4 of all LAC episodes last between
2t o3y e a r s — .
The most prominent fact that emerges from Figure 2 is that the inﬂation
rate following episodes does pick up considerably in the 70s and 80s, whereas
during the 90s, the post-episode inﬂation rate appears to stabilize below the
starting point. This signals that, during the 90s, countries were able to lock-
in the gains made by disinﬂations but were unable to do so during the earlier
decades. In Hofstetter (2007b), I show that this fact also occurs in disinﬂa-
tions of the G7 nations and study the determinants of the sustainability of
disinﬂations.
In what follows, we study the behavior of the current account, GDP
growth and the exchange rate, each in a separate section. In each case, we
ﬁrst discuss the expected path of each variable according to economic theory
and the empirical results of other studies (usually with OECD data). We
6Inflation 70s−80s













Figure 2: Inﬂation in 2-3 year long episodes with 90% intervals (shaded areas).
Source: Hofstetter, 2007a.
then provide graphical evidence on the average behavior of each variable in
our sample of LAC disinﬂations and ﬁnally perform some statistical tests to
verify the robustness of the results emerging from the plots.
3 The current account during disinﬂations
How does the current account react to disinﬂationary shocks? From a theo-
retical standpoint, the traditional results pioneered by the Mundell-Fleming
model predict that the current account should worsen following a contrac-
tionary monetary shock. Using a more modern and sophisticated framework,
Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ (1995) support this implication. Nevertheless, this view has
not gone unchallenged. For instance, Lane (2000), building on the Redux
framework by adding a non-tradable sector, shows that the eﬀect of mone-
t a r ys h o c k so nt h ec u r r e n ta c c o u n ti sa m b i g u o u s ;i td e p e n d so nt h er e l a t i v e
size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution vis a vis the intratemporal
elasticity between traded and non-traded goods.2
From an empirical standpoint, Lane (2000), shows that, in the US, the
2A contractionary monetary shock appreciates the exchange rate (that is, the prices
of tradable goods fall) and reduces the production and consumption of non-tradables.
As the consumption of non-tradables decreases, so does the consumption of tradables
if the elasticity of substitution between the goods is low (relative to the intertemporal
elasticity). Such a scenario leads to an improvement of the current account. If the elasticity
of substitution between the goods is higher, then the short-run real appreciation eﬀect
dominates, and the contractionary shock sends the current account into deﬁcit.
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Figure 3: Trade Balance as a % of GDP during disinﬂations. Shaded regions are
90% conﬁdence intervals. The straight lines represent the weighted median trade
balance (as a % of GDP) of LAC during period 0 for the respective decades.
current account responds positively to expansionary monetary shocks. That
eﬀect is signiﬁcant and occurs following a short period during which the
current account actually goes into deﬁcit. In other words, the current account
follows a J-curve type of path after a positive monetary shock.
3.1 Current Account I: the impulse response
For the empirical tests in this section, we use the trade balance as a proxy of
the current account. The reason for this is that the trade balance data has a
better coverage of our sample than the data on the current account. Figure
3 depicts the average reaction of the trade balance across episodes following
a disinﬂationary shock. Again, period 0 is where inﬂation reached its peak,
and the plots include only two- and three-year long episodes. We also include
a line representing the average trade balance in LAC during period 0.3 The
line allows for a comparison of the variable’s evolution against a regional
threshold. Finally, 90% conﬁdence intervals are included (the shaded areas).
The trajectory of the trade balance —both during the 70s and 80s and
during the 90s—, exhibits a peak in period 0 and a sharp deterioration dur-
ing disinﬂation. Nevertheless, there are important quantitative diﬀerences
3The measure is actually a weighted average of LAC’s median trade balance as a % of
GDP, for period 0. The weights are the number of episodes for each year. Put another
way, if we suppose n1 episodes starting at t1 and n2 episodes starting at t2,and set gt as
the average trade balance of LAC at t, the dashed line becomes:
(n1∗gt1)+(n2∗gt2)
n1+n2 .
8across the decades. The worsening of the trade balance during the 90s be-
gins from a much larger initial deﬁcit, such that by the time the deterioration
process reaches its trough, the mean trade balance deﬁcit is almost twice as
large as that of the earlier decades. Of course, what fuels those level diﬀer-
ences, are the huge capital inﬂows that ﬂooded the region during the ﬁrst
half of the 90s; these allowed the ﬁnancing of overall larger current account
deﬁcits.4 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, what matters most is
the reaction of the current account following disinﬂationary shocks, rather
than the initial (deﬁcit) level. Under that optic, the crucial point is that —in
line with Lane’s empirical ﬁndings for the US (2000)— the plots suggest that
LAC disinﬂationary shocks are indeed followed by a signiﬁcant trade balance
deterioration.
3.2 Current Account II: the whole sample
The results in Figure 3 focused on two and three year long episodes. Here
we provide further evidence concerning the behavior of the trade balance
during disinﬂations using the whole sample of episodes. The main hypothesis
we test is whether the trade balance during disinﬂations is smaller than
those before and after the episodes. The graphical evidence suggested that
the deterioration of the trade balance should start in period 1. Building
on that ﬁnding, the ‘during group’ is deﬁned as periods [1,T] with ‘before’
and ‘after’ constituting the three adjacent years preceding and following
the during sample respectively. We then test whether there are statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the means of each of these three groups. The
results are presented in Table 2 for the 70s and 80s, and in Table 3 for the
90s.
The ﬁrst result that stands out is that the current account does indeed
worsen during disinﬂations relative to the trade balance prior to them. This
results holds across the decades and is statistically signiﬁcant in the baseline
test.
4For a good discussion on the capital inﬂow dynamics to the LAC countries during the
90s, see Calvo, Reinhart and Leiderman’s trilogy, (1993, 1994 & 1996).
91970s &  1980s
Numb. of  Mean Trade B.  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Observ. % GDP
Before peak [-2,0] 66 -2.66 -0.91 -2.51 -2.67 -0.68
During Episode [1, T] 57 -4.19 -1.71 -4.19 -4.15 -1.52
After Trough [T+1,T+3] 66 -3.36 -1.68 -3.29 -3.36 -1.71
H0: Before = During, t-stat   1.81** 0.94   1.74**   1.7** 0.85
H0: After = During, t-stat 0.98 0.37 0.99 0.90 0.20
H0: Before = After, t-stat 0.86 0.94 0.79 0.85 1.04
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 2.5% level
(1): Annual Trade Balance deficit measured in deviations w.r.t LAC annual median
(2): Trade Balance Deficit. Sample excluding observation if: inflation surpasses 40% or they hit a neighboring episode
(3): Trade Balance Deficit. "During" sample restricted to [1, 4] length
(4): Trade Balance Deficit. All restrictions (1)-(3) simultaneously in place
Robustness
Table 2. Trade balance as a % of GDP. 1970s & 1980s.
Interestingly, the trade balances after and during disinﬂations are not
statistically diﬀerent. This result implies that the current account does not
recuperate rapidly, i.e., monetary shocks seem to have long-lasting eﬀects on
the trade balance. For the 90s, that result is even more emphatic: during that
decade, the trade balance before the disinﬂation is larger than after and that
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, though only at the 10% level. In other words, the
deterioration of the trade balance did not stop with the end of disinﬂations.
Robustness: The last four columns of Tables 2 and 3 perform some
robustness tests. Column (1) controls for exogenous shocks that might aﬀect
t h er e g i o n a lt r a d eb a l a n c e( f o ri n s t a n c e ,t h ed e b tc r i s i so ft h ee a r l y8 0 s )a n d
are independent of the disinﬂationary shocks. To control for these exogenous
shocks, we obtain for each country and year in the sample the deviations
of trade balance from the LAC annual median and repeat the tests of the
baseline case using the transformed data. Column (2) veriﬁe st h ei m p a c to f
excluding observations (in the after and before groups) when the economies
hit inﬂation crisis levels (40%), or when they coincide with the during part of
an adjacent disinﬂation. Column (3) controls for the episode’s length —i.e. it
only includes observations in the during group up to year 3, and drops those
between 4 and T. The strategy adopted up to this point was to include in the
during group any observation between 1 and T but this biases the sample
against short episodes. Finally, (4) considers all the robustness controls —
i.e., (1) through (3)— simultaneously.
Taken as a whole, the conclusions are not altered by the robustness tests.
There is a deterioration of the trade balance following the disinﬂationary
shock, a result similar to Lane’s ﬁndings discussed above. Moreover, the
10trade balance does not recuperate after the episodes are over, suggesting
that there are long-lived consequences of disinﬂations.
1990s
Numb. of  Mean Trade B.  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Observ. % GDP
Before peak [-2,0] 36 -5.20 -2.19 -4.30 -5.21 -1.56
During Episode [1, T] 40 -8.30 -4.00 -8.28 -8.20 -3.91
After Trough [T+1,T+3] 29 -7.30 -3.42 -7.19 -7.27 -3.54
H0: Before = During, t-stat    2.43*** 1.45*    2.7***    2.28***  1.58*
H0: After = During, t-stat 0.75 0.45 0.75 0.67 0.25
H0: Before = After, t-stat 1.5* 1.23   1.74** 1.49* 1.21
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 2.5% level
(1): Annual Trade Balance deficit measured in deviations w.r.t LAC annual median
(2): Trade Balance Deficit. Sample excluding observation if: inflation surpasses 40% or they hit a neighboring episode
(3): Trade Balance Deficit. "During" sample restricted to [1, 4] length
(4): Trade Balance Deficit. All restrictions (1)-(3) simultaneously in place
Robustness
Table 3. Trade balance as a % of GDP, 1990s.
4 GDP growth during disinﬂations
Do disinﬂations cause output contractions in LAC? The evidence from OECD
nations points to a robust pattern showing that disinﬂations cause recessions
(see Ball 1994, Zhang 2005).5 Most research with LAC data has focused
on stabilizations from high inﬂation rates. Part of that literature questions
the view that disinﬂations (now from high inﬂation rates) cause recessions.
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992) and Végh (1992), claim that the output’s path
during Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations (ERBS) follows a boom-recession
cycle —that is, in the initial phases of the stabilization the economy booms,
and it is only later that a recession occurs.6 Nevertheless, subsequent papers
by Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Hamann (2001) suggest that once the
5Economists have proposed multiple theoretical models to explain this fact. At the
aggregate level, the theoretical underpinnings of the idea are closely related to those found
in the Phillips curve literature, where an explicit (usually short-run) trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and unemployment is established. Some early attempts to rationalize the trade-
oﬀ include Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1980), who based their result on the notion of
staggered contracts. Fischer (1986) extended the lessons to an open economy whereas,
more recently Mankiw and Reis (2002) built a model where the driving force of the result
is the slow dissemination of information.
6Succesive follow-ups on that literature, using the same hypothesis as the original 1992
papers include Calvo and Végh (1994, 1999), De Gregorio, Guidotti and Végh (1998), and
Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002), among others.
11sample is extended outside the Southern Cone, the stabilizations from high
inﬂation rates generate output expansions independently of the anchor used.7
4.1 GDP growth I: the impulse response
We take a ﬁrst look at the behavior of GDP in Figure 4, which depicts the
average real GDP growth rate during disinﬂations. In particular, the plots
show the average growth rate across two- and three-year long episodes, with
period 0 corresponding to the year when the inﬂation peak occurred. The
left panel focuses on the 70s and 80s, while the right one deals with the 90s.
The growth rates in the Figure are “deviations” —i.e., they are constructed
by substracting from each episode (periods −2 to 4)i t sa v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t e
during periods −1 and −2. This allows us to control for diﬀerences in the ini-
tial growth rates across episodes. The plot also includes conﬁdence intervals.
A dashed line going through 0 facilitates interpretation of the conﬁdence
intervals.
As Figure 4 shows, for the 70s and the 80s, there is an important reduction
in the GDP growth rate during disinﬂations, corroborating the conventional
wisdom that disinﬂations are contractionary. As for the size of the recession,
t h eg a pb e t w e e nt h ed a s h e dl i n ea n dt h ea v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t ea tt h et r o u g h
is just short of 3%. Another important feature is that the GDP growth rates
peak prior to inﬂation. In contrast to the GDP slowdown of the 70s and 80s,
the story during the 90s suggests that there is no evidence of a slowdown
during those episodes. During the 90s, LAC countries seem to have escaped
the recession that accompanied disinﬂations during the earlier decades.
4.2 GDP growth II: the whole sample
The 70s and 80s: Is the recession observed during the episodes statistically
signiﬁcant when the whole sample is used? Is the growth rate prevailing after
the episodes diﬀerent from that found prior to the disinﬂation? The answer
to the latter is important as it establishes whether the GDP level returns to
trend after the episode. Failure to ﬁnd a catching-up period would be con-
sistent with long-lived eﬀects on output, which has important consequences
for the literature measuring disinﬂation costs (e.g., Zhang, 2005; Hofstetter,
2007a).
7The debate is not settled yet. Fischer et al (2002) argue once more that expansionary
stabilizations are a phenomena mainly attached to ERBS.
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Figure 4: GDP growth rates with 90% conﬁdence intervals. Source: Hofstetter,
2007a.
To test these hypotheses, we again split the data into three groups —i.e.,
the before group, covering 3 observations preceding the episode; the during
group, including periods 0 through T;a n dt h eafter group,c o v e r i n gt h e3
years following the end of the episodes. As in the previous section, we test
whether there are diﬀerences in the means of the three groups. The results
for the 70s and 80s are presented in Table 4.
1970s &  1980s
Numb. of  Mean GDP  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Observ. Growth
Before peak [-3,-1] 66 4.82 0.50 5.29 4.82 0.96
During Episode [0, T] 79 2.71 -0.53 2.71 2.73 -0.66
After Trough [T+1,T+3] 66 4.33 0.81 4.85 4.33 1.35
H0: Before = During, t-stat   2.69***   1.46*   2.83***   2.58***  1.93**
H0: After = During, t-stat   2.06***   1.89** 2.50***   1.97***   2.54***
H0: Before = After, t-stat 0.60 0.41 0.44 0.60 0.43
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 2.5% level
(1): Annual Output growth rate measured in deviations w.r.t LAC annual median
(2): Y growth. Sample excluding observation if: inflation surpasses 40% or they hit a neighboring episode
(3): Y growth. "During" sample restricted to [0, 3] length
(4): Y growth. All restrictions (1)-(3) simultaneously in place
Robustness
Table 4. Output growth during disinﬂations in LAC. 70s & 80s
The ﬁrst important ﬁnding for the 70s and 80s is that the growth rate
during the episodes is smaller than after and before, and that these diﬀerences
are signiﬁcant. As suggested in the plot, output growth did indeed slow down
during the disinﬂations of the 70s and 80s. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the evidence from OECD disinﬂations (e.g., Ball, 1994).
13On the other hand, we do not observe a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the growth rate after and prior to the peaks. Hence, there is no
catching-up period — i.e., where the growth rate following the episode picks
up and brings the output level back to trend. The implication is that, for
the 70s and 80s, the GDP growth path is consistent with long-lived eﬀects
on the output level, a fact also present in OECD disinﬂations (see Zhang,
2005).8
Table 5 performs a similar exercise for the 90s. In line with the im-
plications derived from the impulse responses, there is no evidence that the
growth rate during the episodes is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that prior or af-
ter them. More speciﬁcally, there is no growth slowdown during the episodes
of the 90s; at the same time it is not possible to characterize the behavior
as a statistically signiﬁcant boom.9 The ﬁnding that disinﬂations of the 90s
were not contractionary is certainly a striking result. For policymakers, it
poses the question of whether they can count on such behavior in the future
—i.e., if the conditions that allowed costless disinﬂations are the new status
quo. Again, answering this question goes beyond the scope of this paper,
but we take steps towards answering it in Hofstetter 2007a. Our answer in
that companion paper is emphatic: the conditions that allowed costless dis-
inﬂations are not the new status quo; policymakers should not expect a free
lunch when attempting to disinﬂate form low and moderate inﬂation rates
in the future.
8Nevertheless, some caution should be used in interpreting this result. Indeed, the
conclusion hinges on the growth rate prior to disinﬂation being the ‘normal’ growth rate.
It is conceivable though that the presence of rising inﬂation might be a symptom of a
reheated economy. If that were the case, the growth rate prior to disinﬂation would be
above average.
9Given that the direction in which growth moves across groups for the 90s is unclear,
the statistical tests are two-tailed.
141990
Numb. of  Mean GDP  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observ. Growth
Before peak [-3,-1] 36 3.92 0.17 3.96 3.92 0.22 3.68
During Episode [0, T] 52 3.69 -0.07 3.69 3.81 -0.07 3.77
After Trough [T+1,T+3] 29 2.80 -0.50 2.34 2.80 -0.82 2.80
H0: Before = During, t-stat 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.20 0.43 0.15
H0: After = During, t-stat 1.53 0.75  2.18** 1.66* 1.15 1.58
H0: Before = After, t-stat 1.79* 1.09  2.2** 1.77* 1.38 1.30
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level
(1): Annual Output growth rate measured in deviations w.r.t LAC annual median
(2): Y growth. Sample excluding observation if: inflation surpasses 40% or they hit a neighboring episode
(3): Y growth. "During" sample restricted to [0, 3] length
(4): Y growth. All restrictions (1)-(3) simultaneously in place
(5): During defined as [1,T] and before as [-2,0]
Robustness
Table 5. Output growth rates during disinﬂations in LAC. 1990s.
Robustness: For the 70s and 80s, the results in Table 4 under columns
(1), (2), (3) and (4) for the additional tests, indicate that all the conclusions
reached sofar are remarkably robust. The during group remains on average
signiﬁcantly smaller than the before and after groups; moreover, there is no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the before and the after groups.
We perform the same robustness tests for the 90s in Table 5, though
adding one test under column (5). The latter veriﬁes whether or not shifting
the deﬁnition of before and during one period ahead, alters the conclusions.
This test makes sure that the results are not driven by the trough in period 0,
that we identiﬁed in the impulse response. All the robustness tests for the 90s
corroborate that there is no evidence of a recession during the disinﬂations.
If anything, there is some weak evidence that the output during the episodes
is higher than the output after them.
5 Exchange rates during disinﬂations
In a disinﬂationary context, the nominal exchange rate can be aﬀected by
at least two diﬀerent policy-related shocks. (i) It is possible for monetary
authorities to use the exchange rate itself as the principal tool for disinﬂating,
in what would constitute an exchange rate based disinﬂation. If that is
the case, the exchange rate devaluation rate during the episode should be
reduced or, in the extreme case, where the policy involves ﬁxing the currency,
become zero. (ii) It is also conceivable, that monetary authorities disinﬂate
with traditional monetary contractions and/or interest rate hikes. If that
15is the case, following a contractionary monetary shock, almost any model
of exchange rate determination based on the fundamentals of the economy
would predict a reduction in the nominal devaluation rate.10
As for the real exchange rate, several models with sticky prices do also
predict its appreciation in response to monetary contractions. The early
contributions of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch models, and more recent
treatments like Beaudry and Devereux (1995), Obstfeld (1985) and Corsetti
and Pesenti (2001), are good examples of this results.
From an empirical standpoint, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, p. 621) argue
that “[c]ountries that adopt dramatic monetary tightening almost invariably
appear to experience real currency appreciation.” This conclusion is formally
reached, for example, in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). They point-out
that contractionary monetary policy shocks yield to persistent and signiﬁ-
cant appreciations of both nominal and real exchange rates (for US data).
Furthermore, these ﬁndings do not only hold in disinﬂations from low or
moderate peaks. Indeed, using a stabilization sample from high inﬂation
rates, Calvo and Végh (1999) argue that the real exchange rates appreciate,
irrespective of the nominal anchor used to disinﬂate.
5.1 Exchange rate I: the impulse response
Since parallel rates are more likely to reﬂect the path followed by a market-
determined exchange rate, we use parallel bilateral exchange rates against
the US dollar for the empirical exercises in this section.11 Exchange rates are
deﬁned such that increases in the variable represent depreciations. The data
is taken from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2004) database (see the Appendix for
details).
Although the main goal of this section is to track the evolution of the real
10For a good survey on exchange rate determination, see Frankel and Rose (1995) or
Taylor (1995).
11Eﬀective rates built by the IFS, which would also be a good choice, are only available
since the early 80s and only for a handful of countries in the region. Furthermore, oﬃcial
exchange rates are inadequate for our purposes. Indeed, many LAC countries had ﬁxed
oﬃcial nominal exchange rates throughout the 70s, and also (though less widespread)
during the 80s and 90s. Those that did not have ﬁxed exchange rate regimes often opted
for crawling pegs, where the exchange rate was still determined by the government. For
both scenarios, the oﬃcial rates were not likely to reﬂect market oriented exchange rates,
and diﬀerences between parallel and oﬃcial rates could be substantial, as Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ (2004) report.
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Figure 5: Nominal Devaluation Rate. Shaded regions are 90% conﬁdence intervals.
An increase in the variable represents a depreciation.
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Figure 6: Real Devaluation rate during disinﬂations. Increases in the variable
reﬂect depreciations. Shaded Regions are 90% conﬁdence intervals.
exchange rate during disinﬂations, for the sake of completeness, we plot in
Figure 5 the average impulse response of the nominal exchange rate across
episodes. The plots show that the nominal devaluation rate follows a path
resembling the one described for inﬂation —i.e., (i) it peaks in period 0 and
falls thereafter in a similar fashion; and (ii) during the 90s, depreciation
remains low after the episodes are over, whereas for the earlier decades it
increases and almost reaches the starting point by period 4. Indeed, notice
that in period 4, depreciation during the 70s and 80s is already above 20%,
while during the 90s, it remains below the 10% mark.
Figure 6 depicts the changes in the real exchange rate calculated against
17the US dollar —i.e., RER = EP∗/P,w h e r eE is the nominal exchange rate,
and P∗, P are consumer price indices in the US and the respective LAC
country. A dashed line going through zero is included. Numbers below the
line represent appreciations of the RER.
In both panels, the real exchange rate appreciates during disinﬂations.
For the 70s and 80s, the appreciation occurs during the ﬁrst year and in
a statistically signiﬁcant manner. For the 90s, the real appreciation lasts
l o n g e r—f o r3y e a r s —w i t ht h eﬁrst two years being statistically signiﬁcant.
Of course, part of the diﬀerence between the 90s and the earlier decades is
that during the 90s many countries experienced periods of real appreciation
fueled by capital inﬂows. This was particularly true during the ﬁrst part of
the decade. What the plots suggest is that disinﬂations make the appreciation
more acute, independent of the starting point of the real exchange rate.
5 . 2 R e a lE x c h a n g eR a t eI I :t h ew h o l es a m p l e
As with the current account and GDP growth, we now test whether the
t r e n d si nF i g u r e6h o l dt r u eo n c ew et a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ew h o l es a m p l e .I n
particular, we test if the mean for the RER for the groups before, during and
after disinﬂations are statistically diﬀerent. Again, the during group includes
periods [1,T], while the before and after groups cover three adjacent years
before and after the during group, respectively. Table 6 presents the results
for the changes in the real exchange rate during the 70s and 80s, while Table
7 reports them for the 90s.
70s and 80s
Numb. of  Change in (1) (2) (3)
Observ. Real Exch. Rate
Before peak [-2,0] 47 5.4% 3.8% 5.4% 3.8%
During Episode [1, T] 47 -2.5% -2.5% -2.3% -2.3%
After Trough [T+1,T+3] 60 5.0% 7.0% 5.0% 7.0%
H0: Before = During, t-stat    2.22***   1.65**    2.13***  1.57*
H0: After = During, t-stat    2.25***    2.68***    2.15***    2.57***
H0: Before = After, t-stat 0.10 0.84 0.10 0.83
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 2.5% level
(1): Real Depreciation. Sample excluding observation if: inflation surpasses 40% or they hit a neighboring episode
(2): Real Depreciation. "During" sample restricted to [1, 4] length
(3): Real Depreciation. All restrictions (1)-(2) simultaneously in place
Robustness
Table 6. Tests for the Real Exchange Rate. 70s and 80s.
18As predicted by the theories outlined above and suggested by the evidence
in the plots, an average appreciation of the real exchange rate does indeed
occur during the episodes. The annual revaluation during disinﬂations of the
7 0 sa n d8 0 si s2 . 5 %w h e r e a sf o rt h ed i s i n ﬂations of the 90s it reaches 6%. In
both cases, the behavior of the exchange rate during the episodes is statisti-
cally diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a tf o rt h eg r o u p sprior and after, a result that remains
ﬁrm throughout the robustness tests. As Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) ﬁnd
for the US, disinﬂations in LAC are associated with RER appreciations.
90s
Numb. of  Change in (1) (2) (3)
Observ. Real Exch. Rate
Before peak [-2,0] 36 -2.8% -0.5% -2.8% -0.5%
During Episode [1, T] 38 -6.1% -6.1% -6.3% -6.3%
After Trough [T+1,T+3] 19 1.7% 4.1% 1.7% 4.1%
H0: Before = During, t-stat  1.39*    2.27***  1.43*    2.33***
H0: After = During, t-stat    2.69***    3.45***    2.72***    3.47***
H0: Before = After, t-stat  1.52*  1.43*  1.51*  1.41*
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 2.5% level
(1): Real Depreciation. Sample excluding observation if: inflation surpasses 40% or they hit a neighboring episode
(2): Real Depreciation. "During" sample restricted to [1, 4] length
(3): Real Depreciation. All restrictions (1)-(2) simultaneously in place
Robustness
Table 7. Tests for the Real Exchange Rate, 90s.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The successful disinﬂationary process of most LAC countries since the early
90s is certainly one of the most notable economic achievements of the region
in recent times. Indeed, after enduring more than two decades of continuous
inﬂation disasters, the region’s median inﬂation has remained in single digits
for almost a decade. The evidence suggests that most near-future disinﬂa-
tions in LAC will start from low and moderate peaks. Nevertheless, very little
is known about the stylized facts of LAC disinﬂations in that peak range.
This paper ﬁlls part of that gap with the hope of guiding future theoreti-
cal research. It also highlights several consequences of which policymakers
should be aware.
The strategy of this paper consists of using a sample of policy-induced
disinﬂations across countries, and then evaluating the average behavior of
several macroeconomic variables during these disinﬂations. The approach
overcomes the traditional problems faced by methods requiring long and
19stable quarterly or monthly time series, while at the same time, permitting
a similar analysis of the impact of disinﬂationary shocks on macroeconomic
variables.
It is shown that GDP growth slowed down during the disinﬂations of the
70s and 80s. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with the view that disin-
ﬂations have long-lived eﬀects on output level and that the growth slowdown
precedes the fall in inﬂation by about a year. For the 90s, there is no evidence
of a slowdown in the GDP growth rate during disinﬂations.
We also provide evidence of a signiﬁcant trade balance deterioration dur-
ing disinﬂations, and point at possible long-lived eﬀects on that variable.
The quantitative impact is by no means negligible, as the deterioration of
the trade balance reaches almost 3 three percentage points (with respect to
GDP) during disinﬂations of the 90s. The ﬁnding that the current account
deteriorates during disinﬂations is an important result. The theoretical lit-
erature suggests that there are forces that could push the trade balance in
either direction following a disinﬂationary shock; therefore, it is up to the
empirical literature to determine which forces are quantitatively dominant.
Closely linked to the ﬁnding regarding the current account, it is shown
that the nominal devaluation rate slows down during the disinﬂations, mim-
icking the path followed by the inﬂation rate. Furthermore, there is a sig-
niﬁcant average real exchange rate appreciation during the episodes. Both
results are in line with the evidence from the OECD nations.
We should qualify the results. The method used to identify disinﬂations
is based on the actual behavior of inﬂation —i.e., a disinﬂation is identiﬁed if
the inﬂation rate actually falls by a suﬃciently large amount. Some authors
(e.g. Calvo and Vegh, 1999) identify episodes based on the announcement
by monetary authorities of an intention to disinﬂate. Note that the latter
strategy for identifying episodes does not actually require inﬂation to fall.
For our purposes, it is important to note that our results show the conse-
quences of actually bringing the inﬂation down, rather than the consequences
of announcing the intentions to bring it down.
Finally, our paper has only looked at the evolution of a few macroeco-
nomic variables during disinﬂations. Several interesting questions remain to
be explored. For instance, future research could be aimed at exploring the
micro dynamics behind disinﬂations. For instance, studying the productivity,
ﬁrm entry and exit, and the behavior of tradable and non-tradable sectors
during disinﬂations, are areas were our knowledge still appears limited, par-
ticularly with respect to disinﬂations in the LAC countries.
20A Appendix
Data: Most of the variables come from the International Financial Sta-
tistics (IMF, various issues). GDP growth rates and trade balances were
complemented with data from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank, various issues). The exchange rate is built using the data from Rein-
hart and Rogoﬀ (2004). The database has a few blanks. It ends in 1998,
which means that for a few disinﬂations during the 90s, there is no “post
episodes” data. There is also no data for 3 early episodes (Jamaica, Hon-
duras and Guatemala). Finally, Venezuela’s episode during the early 80s has
been discarded, as the exchange rate in 1983 depreciated by almost 200%,
constituting a very large outlier that distorts results.
Country Initial Final   Length Initial   Drop of   % drop of   Speed
 Year Year   Inflation Inflation Inflation  
Honduras 1973 1975 2 9.7 4.3 45 2.2
Paraguay 1973 1975 2 19.6 14.6 74.5 7.3
Dominican Rep 1974 1978 4 13.3 9.6 72.2 2.4
Ecuador 1974 1976 2 19.4 9.2 47.7 4.6
El Salvador 1974 1976 2 17.3 8.4 48.6 4.2
Guatemala 1974 1976 2 14.7 4.1 28.2 2.1
Mexico 1974 1975 1 19.1 5.4 28.5 5.4
Honduras 1979 1987 8 14.5 11.4 78.8 1.4
Dominican Rep 1980 1982 2 14.3 8.1 56.6 4
El Salvador 1980 1982 2 15.9 5.1 32.2 2.6
Venezuela 1980 1983 3 18.6 10.6 56.8 3.5
El Salvador 1989 1991 2 19.5 9.6 49 4.8
Bolivia 1990 1993 3 19.3 11.7 60.7 3.9
El Salvador 1993 1999 6 15.7 14.9 94.6 2.5
Paraguay 1993 1996 3 18.9 10.1 53.5 3.4
Bolivia 1995 1999 4 11.2 8.1 72.3 2
Costa Rica 1995 1998 3 19.5 9.4 48.3 3.1
Guatemala 1996 1998 2 10 4.6 45.8 2.3
Jamaica 1974 1976 2 21.6 11.6 54 5.8
Colombia 1976 1978 2 25.2 7.1 28.4 3.6
Mexico 1977 1978 1 22.6 5.9 26.3 5.9
Jamaica 1978 1982 4 29 21.2 73 5.3
Paraguay 1979 1982 3 24.1 15.9 66.2 5.3
Colombia 1980 1983 3 24.9 7.7 31 2.6
Dominican Rep 1984 1986 2 29.6 20.4 69 10.2
Jamaica 1984 1987 3 24.9 18 72.1 6
Chile 1985 1988 3 24.1 9.6 39.7 3.2
El Salvador 1986 1988 2 27.3 11.2 41.1 5.6
Guatemala 1986 1988 2 25.6 15.7 61.4 7.9
Colombia 1990 1996 6 27 9.4 34.7 1.6
Honduras 1990 1992 2 26.7 17.8 66.7 8.9
Mexico 1990 1993 3 22.8 14.6 64.1 4.9
Costa Rica 1991 1993 2 24.8 14.7 59.4 7.4
Jamaica 1994 1998 4 26.2 19.2 73.3 4.8
Table A. Disinﬂationary episodes in LAC. Source: Hofstetter, 2007a.
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